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Abstract
This empirical paper examines the time delays that occur between the publication of Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures (CVEs) in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) and the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS)
information attached to published CVEs. According to the empirical results based on regularized regression analysis of
over eighty thousand archived vulnerabilities, (i) the CVSS content does not statistically influence the time delays, which,
however, (ii) are strongly affected by a decreasing annual trend. In addition to these results, the paper contributes to
the empirical research tradition of software vulnerabilities by a couple of insights on misuses of statistical methodology.
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1. Introduction
Software vulnerabilities are software bugs that expose
weaknesses in software systems. The CVSS standard is
used to classify the severity of known and disclosed vul-
nerabilities. Once the classification and evaluation work
has been completed for a vulnerability identified with a
CVE, the structured and quantified severity information
is stored to vulnerability databases. Motivated by a recent
empirical evaluation [16], this paper examines the time de-
lays between the publication of CVEs and the usually later
publication of CVSS information. The scope is restricted
to NVD and the second revision of the CVSS standard.
The use of CVSS is mandated and recommended by
many state agencies for assessments in different security-
critical domains [36], including but not limited to medical
devices [38] and the payment card industry [2]. The stan-
dard has been also incorporated into different governmen-
tal security risk, threat, and intelligence systems. Fur-
thermore, CVSS information is used in numerous differ-
ent commercial products [16], ranging from vulnerability
scanners and compliance assessment tools to automated
penetration testing and intrusion detection systems.
CVSS is also widely used in academic research. Typi-
cal application domains include risk analysis [2, 14], secu-
rity audit frameworks [4], so-called attack graphs [7, 26],
and empirical assessments using CVSS for different pur-
poses [1, 25, 31, 33]. To these ends, a lot of work has
been done to improve CVSS with different weighting algo-
rithms [17, 40], among other techniques [9, 30]. With some
rare exceptions [13], limited attention has been given for
examining how severity assessments are done in practice.
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Practical approaches are important because CVSS has
faced also challenges. Analogous to problems that have af-
fected CVE assignments [33, 34], different practical prob-
lems have influenced the severity assignments for CVE-
stamped vulnerabilities. Excluding the actual content of
the standard, the historical problems related to classifica-
tion inconsistencies, time delays, and the proliferation of
classification standards [5, 24]. Some of these problems
have continued to exist. For instance, proliferation has
continued in recent years; new standards have been in-
troduced for classifying software misuse and configuration
vulnerabilities [3]. Some countries [45] and companies [43]
have also introduced their own severity metrics. To ex-
amine whether also the problem with time delays is still
present—as has been suspected [18], a brief remark is re-
quired about the CVE and CVSS publication processes in
the context of NVD. Although the available documenta-
tion about these processes is limited [28], the sketch pre-
sented in Fig. 1 is not a far-fetched analytical speculation.
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Figure 1: A Simplified Model for CVSS Processing
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The process starts when security researchers, vendors,
and other related actors request CVEs for vulnerabil-
ities they have discovered or made aware of. These
request-response dynamics are handled by the non-profit
MITRE corporation. As is common in software engineer-
ing, MITRE presumably maintains a backlog for the CVEs
assigned, some of which may be even rejected for inclu-
sion to NVD. Although the structure of the backlog is
unknown, a simple FIFO (first-in, first-out) might be con-
sidered in order to connect the speculation to a recent
theoretical work [10]. In any case, eventually the vulner-
abilities accepted for archiving are published in NVD. In
parallel to the coordination and archiving work related
to CVEs, vulnerabilities are evaluated for their severity
by the NVD team, which largely operates independently
from others carrying similar evaluations [16]. Once the
evaluation has been completed, the CVE-referenced vul-
nerability information is updated in NVD. The time lags
between the initial CVE publications and the later CVSS
updates constitute the empirical phenomenon examined.
There is another viewpoint to the abstract CVE back-
log. This viewpoint originates from the so-called switch-
ing costs, which are often high for information technology
standards [37]. Such theoretical costs cover also database
maintenance: even small changes made to standards may
imply a lot of evaluation work particularly in case old in-
formation needs to be updated. This concern was raised
also during the 2007 introduction of the second revision
of the CVSS standard [36]. In other words, updates can
be costly in terms of time and resources – given the nearly
ninety thousand vulnerabilities currently archived in NVD.
Therefore, it is relevant to ask the following research ques-
tion (RQ) about the time lags affecting CVSS scoring.
RQ1 Do the time delays between CVE publications and
CVSS updates vary systematically according to an an-
nual year-to-year trend?
Another question relates to the content of the CVSS
standard in terms of the vulnerabilities scored. Reflect-
ing the disagreements among experts about the severity
of some vulnerability types [13], it can be hypothesized
that the CVSS content itself affects the time delays. Not
all vulnerabilities are equally easy (or hard) to classify in
terms of severity; hence, some vulnerabilities may take a
relatively short (long) time to classify. This reasoning is
presented as a second research question, stated as follows.
RQ2 Do the time delays vary systematically according to
the content of the CVSS severity information?
Finally, a third and final question can be postulated for
controlling the answers to the earlier two questions:
RQ3 Does the answer to RQ2 hold when also the annual
trend is controlled for?
According to the empirical results, only the answer to
RQ1 is positive. For predicting the time delays, the CVSS
content is largely noise. The statistical effect (RQ2) also
fades away once the annual trend is controlled for (RQ3).
To elaborate how these conclusions are reached, the re-
mainder of this paper is structured into three sections.
Namely: Section 2 introduces the dataset and the opera-
tionalization of the variables used, Section 3 outlines the
statistical methodology and presents the empirical results
along the way, and Section 4 finally discusses the findings.
2. Setup
To outline the setup for the analysis, the following dis-
cussion will address the operationalization of the delay
metric examined the covariates used to model the metric.
2.1. Response
Following the so-called vulnerability life cycle research
tradition [25, 33], the interest relates to a time difference
∆i = τCVSSi − τCVEai , given (1)
τCVSSi ≥ τCVEai for all i = 1, . . . , n.
The integer τCVSSi denotes the day (timestamp) at
which a CVSS entry was generated for the i:th CVE
that was published at τCVEai . In practice, the two times-
tamps map to the fields cvss:generated-on-datetime
and vuln:published-datetime in the NVD’s extensible
markup language schema. Although the exact meaning of
the fields is undocumented, the time differences can be in-
terpreted as delays between CVE and CVSS publications.
Of the 89465 archived vulnerabilities with both CVE
and CVSS entries, the condition τCVSSi ≥ τCVEai fails to
satisfy only for 1375 vulnerabilities. Without loss of gen-
erality, these cases were excluded. The same applies to
CVEs without severity records. At the time of retriev-
ing the NVD content [27], there were 2218 vulnerabilities
that were published but still lacked CVSS records. Most
of these cases relate either to new vulnerabilities that are
still in the pipeline for severity assessments, or to already
published CVEs that were later rejected as inappropriate
for archiving. Either way, these had to be also excluded in
order for ∆i to be defined for all cases observed. In total,
the dataset examined contains n = 89465− 1375 = 88090
archived cases. Given these cases, the distribution of the
time delays observed is shown in Fig. 2.
The timelines exhibit a heavy-tailed distribution with
extremely long right tail. A half of the vulnerabilities ob-
served have seen severity assignments already a day after
CVEs were published, but the standard deviation is still
over a year. Most of this deviation is caused by a few ex-
treme outliers for which the severity scores were assigned
even a decade after the CVEs were originally published.
To briefly probe these outliers further, Fig. 3. displays
the distribution of another time difference
δi = τCVSSi − τCVEbi , (2)
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Figure 2: CVE-CVSS Publication Time Delays (Eq. 1)
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Figure 3: CVE-CVSS Modification Time Delays (Eq. 2)
where τCVEbi denotes the vuln:last-modified-datetime
field in NVD. The large amount of negative values indicate
that CVEs are often updated after these were already pub-
lished with CVSS information. Interestingly, 187 outlying
cases satisfy δi > 0, which may point toward some in-
consistencies in database maintenance; CVSS information
was generated without updating the corresponding τCVEbi
timestamps. About a quarter of the cases observed sat-
isfy δi = 0, meaning that the latest CVE modifications
matched the generation of severity information.
2.2. Covariates
Two types of covariates are used for modeling the time
delays in (1). The first contains the CVSS information it-
self. The CVSS (v. 2) standard [6] classifies the impact of
vulnerabilities according to confidentiality, integrity, and
availability (CIA). Each letter in the CIA acronym further
expands into three categories that characterize the impact
upon successfully exploiting the vulnerability in question.
Thus, the analytical structure behind the impact dimen-
sion can be illustrated with a diagram:
IMPACT ∈

CONFIDENTIALITY ∈

NONE∗
PARTIAL
COMPLETE
INTEGRITY ∈

NONE∗
PARTIAL
COMPLETE
AVAILABILITY ∈

NONE∗
PARTIAL
COMPLETE
The three impact metrics measure the severity of a vul-
nerability on a system after the vulnerability has already
been exploited. However, not all vulnerabilities can be
exploited; therefore, the CVSS standard specifies also an
exploitability dimension for vulnerabilities. Like with the
impact dimension, exploitability expands into three met-
rics (access vector, complexity, and authentication) that
can each take three distinct values. The analytical mean-
ing can be again summarized with the following diagram:
EXPLOITABILITY ∈

VECTOR ∈

LOCAL∗
NETWORK
ADJACENT
COMPLEXITY ∈

LOW∗
MEDIUM
HIGH
AUTHENTICATION ∈

NONE∗
SINGLE
MULTIPLE
The rationale for the impact and exploitability metrics
relate to different combinatory relationships between the
different values the metrics can take. For instance, it is
probable that mass-scale attacking tools target less com-
plex vulnerabilities that can be exploited through a net-
work without performing authentication, possibly regard-
less of the impact upon confidentiality, integrity, and avail-
ability. There exists also some empirical evidence along
these lines [1]. However, the impact and exploitability di-
mensions both relate to intrinsic characteristics of vulner-
abilities; they are constant across time and environments.
For instance, EXPLOITABILITY cannot answer to a tem-
poral question about whether an exploit is known to exists
for the vulnerability in question [30, 43]. The same point
extends toward NVD in general [8]. For these and other
reasons, the new (v. 3) standard for CVSS enlarges the
dimensions toward temporal and environmental metrics.
For the present purposes, however, the impact and ex-
ploitability dimensions are sufficient for soliciting an an-
swers to RQ2. This choice is also necessitated by the pa-
per’s focus on NVD, which does not currently provide full
CVSS v. 3 information [29]. Despite of this limitation, a
correlation between the six CVSS metrics and ∆i could
be expected due to the fairly detailed criteria used for
the manual classification. Complex vulnerabilities with se-
vere impact may require more evaluation work than triv-
ial vulnerabilities; a remote buffer overflow vulnerability
is usually more difficult to interpret compared to a trivial
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cross-site scripting vulnerability. Also the reverse direc-
tion is theoretically possible; more effort may be devoted
for high-profile vulnerabilities [18]. Either way, RQ2 seems
like a sensible hypothesis worth asking.
With regard to statistical modeling, the three impact
metrics and the three exploitability metrics are included in
the models as so-called dummy variables. For each metric,
the reference category is marked with a star in the previ-
ous two diagrams. For instance, INTEGRITY is expanded
into two dummy variables, INTEGRITY(PARTIAL) and
INTEGRITY(COMPLETE), say, the effects of which are
compared against INTEGRITY(NONE), which cannot be
included in the models due to multicollinearity. The same
strategy applies to the metrics used for evaluating RQ1.
Namely, the annual effects are proxied through 18 dummy
variables that record the year at which a vulnerability was
published according to τCVEai . Because only five vulnera-
bilities were published in the 1980s and a negiligle amount
(about 1.8 %) in the 1990s, the reference category for the
annual dummy variables is formed by collapsing all vul-
nerabilities published prior to 2000 into a single group.
Given the two CVSS dimensions and the dummy variable
approximation for the annual trend, three model matrices
(X1, X2, and X3) are used in the statistical computation:
M1 : X1 =
[
1,XIMPACT
]
,
M2 : X2 =
[
X1,XEXPLOITABILITY
]
,
M3 : X3 =
[
X2,XANNUAL
]
.
(3)
The first model M1 regresses ∆ = [∆1, . . . ,∆n]
′ against
a constant represented by a n-length vector of ones, 1, and
the six impact dummy variables present in the (n×6) ma-
trix XIMPACT. The second model is identical except that
further six dummy variables are included for measuring
the exploitability dimension. The third and final model
includes all information used.
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Figure 4: Annual Time Delays (based on τCVEai )
Despite of the growing number of CVEs processed from
the circa mid-2000s onward [32], the time delays for CVSS
processing have steadily decreased over the years. As can
be seen from Fig. 4, there have been no extreme outliers in
recent years, meaning that most of the right tail in Fig. 2
is attributable to older CVEs. A possible but speculative
explanation is that the work done to update old CVEs
with CVSS (v. 2) information has mostly been completed.
The strong decreasing trend is likely to support a posi-
tive answer to the research question RQ1. Given this prior
expectation, the main interest in the forthcoming analy-
sis relates to the statistical effect of the impact and ex-
ploitability metrics when also the annual trend is modeled.
One strategy for evaluating the research question RQ3 is
to compare the models M1 and M2 against the full infor-
mation model M3. If the CVSS metrics provide statistical
power for predicting ∆, this power should be visible also
when the decreasing annual trend is controlled for.
3. Results
The response ∆ represents a count data vector; each
observation in the vector counts the days between CVE
and CVSS publications in NVD. Thus, a Poisson regression
model provides a natural starting point for modeling the
time delays. The expected value of the response thus is
E (∆ | Xj) = eXjβ, (4)
where Xj is a given model matrix from (3) and β a
k-length vector of regression coefficients, including the in-
tercept β1. This conditional mean is always positive.
However, the model assumes that ∆ is distributed from
the Poisson distribution, which, in turn, implies that the
mean of the time delays should equal the variance of the
delays. As can be concluded from the numbers shown in
Fig. 2, this assumption is clearly problematic in the current
setting. While β is still consistently estimated, the appar-
ent overdispersion, Var(∆) > E(∆), affects the standard
errors of the regression coefficients, and, hence, the statis-
tical significance of the coefficients. A common solution
to tackle the overdispersion problem is to estimate a so-
called negative binomial model (NBM) instead, although
the conventional ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
often works well in applied problems when the response is
suitably transformed [15]. Thus, instead of (4), consider
that the conditional mean is given by an OLS regression
E(ln[∆ + 1] | Xj) = E(∆˜ | Xj) = Xjβ, (5)
such that
βˆa = min
β
(∆˜−Xjβ)′(∆˜−Xjβ). (6)
When applied to the full model matrix X3, the adjusted
coefficient of determination is 0.64 for this OLS regression.
In other words, the general model performance is quite
decent, given the limited amount of information used to
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model the severity assignment timelines. Moreover, only
three coefficients in βˆa are not significant at the conven-
tional p < 0.05 threshold. By further testing the joint sig-
nificance of the dummy variable groups with a F -test, all
groups are significant at a p < 0.001 level. Also the com-
bined forward-stepwise and backward-stepwise algorithm
(as implemented in the step function for R) retains all
coefficients in βˆa. As is common in applied problems [35],
the ∆˜ = ln(∆ + 1) transformation does not account for
the high positive skew; therefore, another test can be com-
puted by using an R implementation [44] for a consistent
covariance matrix estimator [42]. However, the results do
not diverge much from the plain OLS estimates; only one
additional coefficient is insignificant at a p < 0.05 thresh-
old. Finally, analogous conclusions can be reached by es-
timating a negative binomial regression model with the
assumption that Var(∆) = E(∆) + φ[E(∆)]2, where φ is
a parameter to be estimated [19, 41]. By again using an R
implementation [20], only two coefficients attain p ≥ 0.05.
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Figure 5: Coefficients from the OLS and NBM Regressions (M3)
Thus, based on statistical significance, positive answers
would be given to all three research questions. This con-
clusion would be unwarranted, however. Most of the coef-
ficients in the M3 model are close to zero, irrespective of
the estimation strategy. Since all covariates are dummy
variables (and, hence, have the same scale), this observa-
tion can be illustrated in the form of Fig. 5, which plots the
OLS coefficients (y-axis) against the corresponding NBM
coefficients (x-axis), omitting the constant βˆ1. As can be
seen, there are some differences between the two regres-
sion coefficient vectors, but these differences apply mostly
to the annual effects. In particular, the coefficients for
the impact and exploitability dimensions are very close
to zero without notable differences between the OLS and
NBM estimates. The largest absolute coefficient values are
obtained for the annual effects from 2005 to 2017. These
coefficients exhibit also the largest differences between the
OLS and the negative binomial estimates.
To examine these observations further, the so-called
least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO)
provides a good tool. The LASSO method is a regression
model that uses regularization in order to improve predic-
tion accuracy and feature selection. When compared to
other regularized regression models, such as the so-called
Ridge regression, LASSO can shrink some coefficients ex-
actly to zero. Although the feature selection properties are
not entirely ideal for hypothesis testing [21], this property
is desirable for further examining whether regularization
pushes the coefficients for all of the CVSS metrics toward
zero. It should be noted that dropping individual dummy
variables based on feature selection is usually unwarranted
because interpretation of the coefficients changes—but if
all of the impact and exploitability dummy variables are
regularized toward zero, there is not much to interpret.
If this is the case, there is also no particular reason to
consider more complex estimation strategies, such as the
so-called group LASSO method [39]. A brief elaboration is
required also about the more classical LASSO regressions.
Instead of minimizing the residual sum of squares in (6),
LASSO minimizes penalized sum of squares given by
βˆb = min
β
{
1
2n
n∑
i=1
(∆˜i − x′jiβ)2 + λ
k∑
s=2
|βs|
}
, (7)
where λ ≥ 0 is known as the shrinkage factor, and the scal-
ing by (1/2n) is done to ease comparisons with different
sample sizes [12]. The penalty is given by the L1 norm,
that is, the sum of the absolute coefficient values, omit-
ting the constant present in Xj . If λ is zero, the solution
reduces to the OLS estimates, and when λ→∞, all coef-
ficients in βˆb tend to zero. Despite of the overdispersion,
the Gaussian LASSO in (7) can be accompanied with a
Poisson LASSO as an additional robustness check.
The so-called quasi log-likelihood for Poisson regression
can be obtained by left-multiplying the logarithm of the
expected values in (4) by ∆ and subtracting E (∆ | Xj)
from the result [23]. Given this quasi log-likelihood,
L (β | ∆,Xj) = ∆Xjβ − exp(Xjβ), (8)
LASSO optimizes
βˆc = min
β
{
−L (β | ∆,Xj)
n
+ λ
k∑
s=2
|βs|
}
, (9)
for the Poisson regression [12]. By again using an R imple-
mentation [11], the results from the LASSO computations
are shown in Figures 6 and 7 for the Gaussian and Poisson
specifications. The coefficient magnitudes are shown in the
y-axes, the lower x-axes represent different values of λ in
logarithm scale, and the upper x-axes denote the number
of coefficients not regularized to zero. The shaded region
is based on a 10-fold cross-validation: in each plot, the left
endpoint of the region corresponds with the value of λ that
gives the minimum cross-validation error, while the right
endpoint is one standard error from this minimum.
In both figures, the models M1 and M2 yield large ab-
solute coefficient magnitudes for the CVSS metrics. Fur-
thermore, the coefficients retain their magnitudes rather
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long as the shrinkage factor increases. For instance, the
upper-left plot indicates that none of the impact metrics
are regularized to zero in the Gaussian specification until
about λ = exp(−6). However, when the annual affects
are included in M3, all of the CVSS metrics are very close
to zero particularly with respect to βˆb. Although a cou-
ple of exploitability metrics retain their magnitudes within
the cross-validation region shown in the lower-right plot
in Fig. 7, the same conclusion applies more or less also
to the Poisson LASSO model. Furthermore, within the
cross-validation regions, both βˆb and βˆc compare well to
the OLS and NBM coefficient vectors illustrated in Fig. 5.
To conclude: when predicting the time delay from CVE
publications to CVSS assignments, the actual CVSS con-
tent is largely noise; the most relevant readily available
information comes with the decreasing annual trend.
4. Discussion
This short empirical paper examined the time delays
that affect CVSS scoring work in the context of NVD.
Three research questions were presented for guiding the
empirical analysis based on regression methods. The re-
sults are easy to summarize. The CVSS content is corre-
lated with the time delays (RQ2), but the correlations are
spurious; the decreasing annual trend affecting the time
delays (RQ1) also makes the effects of the CVSS con-
tent negiligle (RQ3). Three points are worthwhile to raise
about the significance of these empirical findings.
First, the negative answers to RQ2 and RQ3 are posi-
tive findings in terms of practical applications using CVSS
information. Whether the application context is govern-
mental security intelligence systems or commercial security
assessment tools, there is currently no particular reason to
worry that a NVD data feed would show significant delays
for the CVSS information. Likewise, in 2017, there is no
reason to suspect that information for severe vulnerabili-
ties would tend to arrive later (or earlier) than informa-
tion for mundane vulnerabilities. However, this conclusion
does not apply to historical contexts, and, moreover, the
historically long delays affect also academic research.
Second, the positive answer to RQ1 is a negative find-
ing in terms of existing academic research; the historically
long time delays presumably translate into selection bi-
ases in some existing empirical studies using CVSS infor-
mation. Without naming any particular academic study,
consider that a hypothetical article published in the late
2000s used a NVD-based dataset of CVE-referenced vul-
nerabilities published between 2000 and 2007, say. The
long time delays during this period imply that a lot of the
vulnerabilities in the dataset could not have had CVSS in-
formation. Consequently, some existing academic studies
are exposed to difficult questions related to sample selec-
tion and missing values, among other issues. This concern
is particularly pronounced regarding studies that examine
time-sensitive topics such as vulnerability disclosure.
Third, the results echo the recently raised concern about
the misuse of statistical significance in the software vul-
nerability context [22]. It seems that the size of archival
material stored to vulnerability databases has surpassed a
point after which statistical significance starts to lose its
usefulness for inference in applied research. The current
rate of new vulnerabilities archived – about 17 per day
in 2016 – implies that the problem with statistical signifi-
cance is only going to get worse. The point is particularly
important in case CVEs are referenced with other datasets,
including big data outputted by intrusion detection and re-
lated systems. The regularized regression models used in
this paper offer one solution to consider in further applica-
tions, but more research is required to assess the existing
biases and the potential means for moving forward.
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